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Michael J. White
In his Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke explicitly refers to Newton’s
Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica in laudatory but restrained terms: “Mr. Newton, in
his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many
new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical
Knowledge” (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch [Clarendon Press,
1975], 4.7.3).  Locke’s restraint stands in contrast to such effusive tributes as Edmund Halley’s
Ode (“Come celebrate with me in song the name/ Of Newton, to the Muses dear; for he/
Unlocked the hidden treasuries of Truth:/ So richly through his mind had Phoebus cast/ The
radiance of his own divinity./ Nearer the gods no mortal may approach”) or the famous epitaph of
Alexander Pope (“Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night; / God said, Let Newton be! and all
was light”).
Of course, Locke was neither a poet nor inclined to make use of a poet’s license.  There
can be little doubt, I think, that he respected Newton’s prodigious intellect and admired his
accomplishments.  In the Essay’s “Epistle to the Reader” of 1700, “the incomparable Mr.
Newton” is numbered along with Boyle, Sydenham, and Huygens as one of the commonwealth
of learning’s master-builders in advancing the sciences.  Also more expansive is the 1688 review
of Newton’s Principia in Le Clerc’s Bibliothèque universelle et historique, which many scholars
now believe was written by Locke, and a passage from Locke’s 1693 Some Thoughts Concerning
Education.  Locke was dead by the autumn of 1704.  But a number of early eighteenth-century
Newtonians were prepared to enlist him as a convert–albeit a non-mathematical one–to the cause
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Course of Experimental Philosophy of 1734 names Locke as proto-Newtonian:
The great Mr. Locke was the first who became a Newtonian Philosopher without the Help of Geometry; for
having asked Mr. Huygens, whether all the mathematical Propositions in Sir Isaac’s Principia were true, and
being told he might depend on their Certainty; he took them for granted, and carefully examined the
Reasonings and Corollaries drawn from them, became Master of all the Physicks, and was fully convinc’d
of the great Discoveries contain’d in that Book: Thus also he read the Opticks with Pleasure, acquainting
himself with every thing in them that was not merely mathematical (J. -T. Desaguliers, A Course of
Experimental Philosophy, vol. 1 [John Senex, 1734]).
Recent scholarship pertaining to the relation between Locke and Newton has surely
produced a more nuanced and complex picture than that of Locke as a card-carrying Newtonian
sans the maths.  In particular, Lisa J. Downing’s paper (“Locke’s Newtonianism and Lockean
Newtonianism,” Perspectives on Science, 5: 3 [1997], 285-310) provides a fine treatment of its
topic.  In comparison, my purpose today is limited and, I hope, modest:  I intend to add what I
regard as a footnote to Downing’s paper.  I shall suggest that it is precisely Locke’s
epistemological idealism–that is, his adherence (in common with Descartes) to the Way of
Ideas–that entails that he must regard Newton’s accomplishments in the Principia as
mathematical rather than as a grand edifice of natural science.
I obviously do not have time to undertake a full exposition of Locke’s epistemology. 
Rather, I shall list some fundamental elements of that epistemology that are particularly relevant
to my argument.
(1) The Way of Ideas.  Ideas are the only immediate objects of conscious awareness.  The
term ‘idea’, Locke says, “serves best to stand for whatsover is the Object of the Understanding,
3when a man thinks” (Essay, 1. 1. 8).
(2) Epistemological atomism.  Complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple
components.  “Though the Qualities that affect our Senses, are, in the things themselves, so
united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet ‘tis plain, the Ideas
they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed” (Essay 1. 2. 1).
(3) The double-existence hypothesis.  In the case of our ideas of sensation, a distinction
must be made between the idea, to which we have epistemic access, and what Locke terms a
quality–which is usually conceived by Locke as the cause of the idea but, at least in some cases
(ideas of primary qualities), may be what we could call the external, intentional object or
correlate of the idea.  “To discover the nature of our Ideas the better, and to discourse of them
intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are Ideas or Perceptions in our
Minds; and as they are modifications of matter in the Bodies that cause such perceptions in us. . .
.  Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought or
Understanding, that I call Idea; and Power to produce any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the
Subject wherein that power is” (Essay 2. 8. 7-8).
(4) The primary quality/secondary quality distinction and the corpuscularian hypothesis. 
Some ideas, those of primary qualities, resemble the qualities of material substances that are their
causes.  Other qualities, secondary qualities, do not resemble the qualities of material substances
that are their causes.  In the latter case, Locke follows Boyle and others in hypothesizing that our
ideas of secondary qualities (e.g., color, sounds, smells, flavors) are caused by the primary
qualities of the individually insensible corpuscles of matter constituting material substances. 
However, I agree with Downing that Locke’s adherence to corpuscularianism is hypothetical and
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(5) Knowledge in the strict sense (scientia) as an intuitive-demonstrative relation between
ideas.  “Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.  In this alone it consists” (Essay
4. 1. 2).  Following Descartes, Locke regards the perception of the relation between ideas that is
constitutive of knowledge as either direct and unmediated (that is, what Locke terms ‘intuition’)
or as indirect and mediated by a chain of intuitions linking the two ideas (that is, what Locke
terms ‘demonstration’ or ‘reasoning’).  “In this Case, then, when the Mind cannot so bring its
Ideas together, as by their immediate Comparison, and as it were Juxta-position, or application
one to another, to perceive their Agreement or Disagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of
other Ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discover the Agreement or Disagreement, which it
searches; and this what we call Reasoning. . . .   Those intervening Ideas, which serve to shew
the Agreement of any two others, are called Proofs; and where the Agreement or Disagreement is
by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called Demonstration” (Essay 4. 2. 2-3).
(6) The ideas of modes are their own archetypes, but not the ideas of (material)
substances.  Crucial to Locke’s conception of the difference between mathematics and natural
philosophy is his distinction between ideas of modes and ideas of substances.  “The complex
Ideas of Substances are Ectypes, Copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very
evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever Collection of simple Ideas it
makes of any Substance that exists, it cannot be sure, that it exactly answers all that are in that
Substance.  Since not having tried all the Operations of all other Substances upon it, and found
all the Alterations it would receive from, or cause in other Substances, it cannot have an exact
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and relations, for Locke, are ideas of properties and relations to which we do not attribute
independent, substantial existence.  As he puts it, “Complex Ideas of Modes and Relations, are
Originals, and Archetypes; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any real Existence, to
which the Mind intends them to be conformable and exactly to answer. . . .   The Ideas therefore
of Modes and Relations, cannot but be adequate” (Essay 2. 31. 14).
From these principles of Locke’s epistemology, it is not difficult to deduce his distinction
between mathematics and natural philosophy.  The ideas involved in mathematics are ideas of
modes and relations.  As these are their own archetypes, they constitute what we might term an
epistemically closed system.  The virtue of the mathematician (which Locke recognizes that
Newton possesses in abundance) is sagacity–which is the ability to take two mathematical ideas
and to find a chain of intuitions that can be linked into a demonstrative relation between the ideas
in question (Essay 4. 2. 3).  Interestingly, Locke’s praise of Newton in the fourth book of the
Essay occurs in the context of one his harangues against what he takes to be the abstract and
sterile formalism of the axiomatic-deductive paradigm of scientia.  The starting points of
scientific knowledge are not the axioms or ‘maxims’, as he calls them, of the Schoolmen (or even
those of the ancient geometers), but the acts of intuition by which we are able immediately to
discern concrete points of agreement or disagreement between ideas.  In the case of the
propositions of Newton’s Principia, says Locke, “it was not the general Maxims, What is, is; or
The whole is bigger than a part, or the like, that help’d him.  These were not the Clues that lead
him into the Discovery of the Truth and Certainty of those Propositions” (Essay 4. 7. 3).  He
continues with the wish, “Would those who have this Traditional Admiration of these
6Propositions, that they think no Step can be made in Knowledge without the support of an Axiom,
no Stone laid in the building of the Sciences without a general Maxim, but distinguish between
the Method acquiring Knowledge, and of communicating it; between the Method of raising any
Science, and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advanced” (ibid.).
It is clear, then, that Locke’s conception of knowledge in the strict sense, scientia, is an a
priori one.  Scientia consists of truths that are necessary in the sense of being contingent only on
the content of our ideas and the necessary relations, so to speak, among those contents.  Not
surprisingly, mathematics is Locke’s paradigm of such a scientia.  However, he famously (but
perhaps surprisingly) argues that “Morality is capable of demonstration, as well as
Mathematicks.  For the Ideas that Ethicks are conversant about, being all real Essences, and such
as, I imagine, have discoverable connexion and agreement with one another; so far as we can find
their Habitudes and Relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general Truths;
and I doubt not . . . but a great part of Morality might be made out with that clearness, that could
leave, to a considering Man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt the Truth of
Propositions of Mathematicks, which have been demonstrated to him” (Essay 4. 12. 8).
While the scientiae of mathematics and morality are, as Locke would say, conversant
about ideas of modes and relations–which are their own archetypes and, thus, ‘real essences’–the
same is not true for natural philosophy.  In the immediately succeeding section of the Essay,
Locke claims that “in our search after the Knowledge of Substances, our want of Ideas, that are
suitable to such a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite different method.  We advance not
here, as in the other (where our abstract Ideas are real as well as nominal Essences) by
contemplating our Ideas, and considering their Relations and Correspondencies; that helps us
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Preeminent among those reasons is Locke’s doctrine that our complex ideas of (material)
substances are only ectypal and not archetypal; in other words, we have access only to the
nominal essences of physical substances.
The result, as well described by Downing and other commentators, is Locke’s view that
natural philosophy must largely rest content with being, in effect, natural history–which is not a
true scientia of nature.  This view is clearly and eloquently summarized in the fourth book of the
Essay:
This way of getting, and improving our knowledge in Substances only by Experience and History, which is
all that the weakness of our Faculties in this state of Mediocrity, which we are in in this World, can attain
to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science.  We are able, I
imagine, to reach very little general Knowledge concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several
Properties.  Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we draw Advantages of
Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life; but beyond this, I fear, our
Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance (Essay 4. 12. 10).
I agree with Downing that Locke did not substantially modify his position in his later and
arguable more laudatory comments on Newton’s accomplishments in his Some Thoughts
Concerning Education or in his review of Newton’s Principia, if indeed he was the author of the
review.  In brief, Locke’s Way of Ideas epistemology precludes the possibility of mathematics
imparting its scientific certainty to natural philosophy.
I conclude with brief discussions of two issues to which I do not have the time to accord
the consideration that they are due.  The first is the fact that Newton clearly does not share
Locke’s doctrine of the relation between mathematics and natural philosophy.  Even in his short
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the influence of his mentor Isaac Barrow) that “geometry is founded in mechanical practice, and
is nothing but that part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes and demonstrates the
art of measuring” (“Newton’s Preface to the First Edition, Newton’s Principia: Motte’s
Translation Revised, ed. F. Cajori [University of California Press, 1971], vol. 1, xvii).  So the
connection between mathematics and natural philosophy is deep and, as it were, axiomatic for
Newton.
Newton’s primary interests lay in mathematics and (pace, Locke) natural philosophy. 
Insofar as he was interested in metaphysics, his interest was largely confined to metaphysica
specialis or theology, not to metaphysica generalis. And, beyond his obvious concern with
scientific methodology, he evidences little interest in systematic epistemology.  This limitation–if
limitation it is–probably saved him from what might be termed the foundational problems for the
application of mathematics to natural philosophy attendant on the Way of Ideas epistemology
regnant on both sides of the English Channel.  In his splendid recent book (Isaac Newton on
Mathematical Certainty and Method [The MIT Press, 2009]), Niccolò Guicciardini documents
Newton’s proclivity for the foundational mathematical doctrines of the ‘ancients’, remarking that
“it seems to me that Newton conflated these two different conceptions of analysis and synthesis
(the Pappian and the Aristotelian) as a rhetorical move aimed at defending the certainty of his
natural philosophy” (324).  I would add only that an Aristotelian ontology of mathematics,
according to which the object of mathematics is the physical, sensible world–but not qua
physical or sensible–would seem much more congenial to Newton’s purposes than some form of
mathematical Platonism.
9Finally, I return to those eighteenth-century Newtonians, such as Desaguliers (and, for
that matter, Voltaire), who were so eager to enroll Locke posthumously in their ranks.  Mordecai
Feingold has shown (“Mathematicians and Naturalists: Sir Isaac Newton and the Royal Society,”
in Isaac Newton ‘s Natural Philosophy, ed. J. Z. Buchwald and I. B. Cohen [The MIT Press,
2001], 77-102) how important the tension between the naturalists or natural historians and the
philomaths was in the history of the Royal Society.  This tension particularly erupted (after the
death of Newton in 1727) in the election for the presidency of the Royal Society contested by
Martin Fowlks, “Newton’s heir presumptive” (Feingold, 77) and candidate of the philomaths
(who, by this time, were virtually all Newtonians), and by Sir Hans Sloane, the candidate of the
naturalists.  Sloane narrowly prevailed, but, in the words of Feingold, the philomaths’
“ringleaders remained recalcitrant” (ibid.).  It seems clear, at least with respect to the theory of
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that John Locke’s affinities were with the
naturalists–at least if their natural history could be translated into the “Advantages of Ease and
Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life” (Essay 4. 12. 10).  What a
coup, then, if the philomaths could conscript the authority of Locke, the ‘second great man’ of
the late seventeenth century, as the “first who became a Newtonian Philosopher without the Help
of Geometry”!
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